When Does FDI Have Positive Spillovers? Evidence from 17 Emerging Market Economies by Svejnar, Jan
 



































 When Does FDI Have Positive Spillovers? 
Evidence from 17 Emerging Market Economies 
 
Yuriy Gorodnichenko Jan Svejnar Katherine Terrell 
UC Berkeley University of Michigan University of Michigan  
 
First Draft, October 2005 
Revised, September 2007 
 
Abstract 
We use firm-level data and national input-output tables from 17 countries over the 2002-
2005 period to test new and existing hypotheses about the impact of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) on the efficiency of domestic firms in the host country (i.e., spillovers). 
Providing evidence from a larger sample of countries and greater variety of firms than 
existing studies, with separate estimates by firm size, age, and sector, we show: a) 
backward spillovers (stemming from supplying a foreign firm in the host country or 
exporting to a foreign firm) are consistently positive; b) horizontal spillovers are mostly 
insignificant but positive for older firms and firms in the service sector; d) forward 
spillovers (from purchasing from foreign firms or importing) are also positive only for 
old and service sector firms. We find no support for the hypothesis that spillovers are 
greater for FDI with more advanced technology. While efficiency of domestic firms’ is 
affected by the business environment, the strength of FDI spillovers is not, either when 
measured by the degree of corruption, bureaucratic red tape or by differences across 
regions that vary in terms of development. Testing whether spillovers vary with the 
firm’s “absorptive capacity” we find: i) distance from the efficiency frontier tends to 
dampen horizontal spillovers in manufacturing and backward spillovers among old firms; 
ii) whereas firms with a larger share of university educated workforce are more 
productive, they do not enjoy greater FDI spillovers than firms with less educated 
workers.  FDI spillovers hence vary by sectors and types of firms. 
JEL: F23, M16, O16, P23 
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1. Introduction 
It is widely accepted that firms in many developing countries were weakened by 
the import-substitution strategies of the 1960s and 1970s. The question that has arisen 
since then is whether domestic firms have become stronger with the opening up of most 
economies to foreign trade and investment. More specifically, has the efficiency of 
domestic firms in emerging market economies improved with the growing presence of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) within their borders and the opening of these economies 
to trade?   While there is substantial evidence that foreign-owned firms are more efficient 
than domestic firms,1 the evidence on FDI spillovers remains relatively mixed.  
In this paper we use the rich 2002 and 2005 Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Surveys (BEEPS) of firms in 17 emerging market (transition) economies, 
together with industry-level input-output data, to advance in a number of dimensions our 
knowledge of when, where and under what conditions FDI has efficiency spillovers on 
domestic firms. First, while most of the literature has focused on horizontal spillovers, we 
examine both vertical and horizontal spillovers.  In this context, we advance the literature 
by being able to analyze forward and backward linkages of multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) with a direct firm-specific variable and compare this with the results using the 
usual indirect industry-specific variable based on input-output tables.2 We also include in 
the analysis of vertical spillovers the concept of selling to or buying from firms outside of 
the country, i.e., importing and exporting, since vertical spillovers need not be 
constrained to linkages with foreign firms within the host country alone.  
Second, we use a broader measure of efficiency than many other studies by 
analyzing how efficiently firms generate sales revenue, taking into account inputs of 
capital, labor and materials. This is equivalent to total factor productivity but broader in 
                                                 
1 See e.g., the seminal work of Caves (1974) and the more recent work of Djankov and Hoekman (2000), 
Haskell, Pereira and Slaughter (2007) and Sabirianova, Svejnar and Terrell (2005b). 
2 In this paper the term MNEs will refer to foreign owned multinationals, although we recognize that 
domestically owned firms can also be multinational in their production and sourcing. 
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that it also captures improvements in pricing, marketing and other aspects of revenue 
generation that are crucial for success of firms in the emerging market economies that are 
trying to catch up with their competitors from advanced countries.3 
Third, we test a number of existing and several new hypotheses. For example, to 
our the best of our knowledge, we are the first to shed light on the impact of a country’s 
institutions (corruption and bureaucratic red tape) and level of development on the 
strength of vertical and horizontal spillovers. We also use our special data set to address 
older questions in the literature such as whether spillovers depend on a firm’s “absorptive 
capacity.” 
Fourth, we are able to provide much larger comparative evidence on more 
heterogeneous firms than has been possible to date.4  Our analysis covers firms in both 
the service and manufacturing sectors, while existing studies focus on manufacturing. 
This is important because most of the recent FDI is in services.  We are also able to 
estimate the effects separately for small firms, while much of the existing evidence is for 
medium and large firms. Being able to cover smaller firms is important because smaller 
firms tend to be the new entrepreneurs and engines of growth in many emerging market 
economies. Finally, we also test for differences in spillovers among new and old firms – 
in our case firms that existed prior to 1990 (before the fall of the communist regime) and 
those that started afterwards.   
We find positive backward spillovers for the domestically owned firms (i.e., 
selling to foreign-owned firms, whether in the country or outside) raises a domestic 
firm’s efficiency.  On the other hand, our estimates suggest that buying inputs from or 
competing with foreign firms confers positive spillovers only in older firms and firms in 
the service sector. We test for the impact of the institutional/business environment on 
                                                 
3 A number of studies in fact use this measure without noting the fact that it is broader than the usual 
output- or value added-based measure of productivity. 
4 Our analysis includes firm level data from Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine.  
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spillovers and do not find a strong effect.  Similarly, our tests for the effect of the 
technological quality of FDI, proxied by whether FDI originates in advanced or 
developing countries, indicate that there is no systematic difference in efficiency 
spillovers from “higher” v. “lower” quality FDI. Finally, there is limited statistical 
support for the argument that the absorptive capacity of firms affects the degree of 
spillovers in that distance of a domestic firm from the efficiency frontier dampens 
horizontal spillovers in manufacturing and backward spillovers among old firms.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present a brief overview of the 
literature, while in Section 3 we describe our data and analytical methodology. We 
present our baseline findings on spillovers in Section 4, our analysis of the institutions 
and quality of FDI in Section 5, and the results related to the absorptive capacity in 
Section 6. We summarize and interpret our findings in the concluding Section 7.  
2. Efficiency Spillovers from FDI 
Foreign firms may have efficiency and other “spillover” effects on local 
competitors (horizontal spillovers) as well as on upstream and downstream domestic 
firms (vertical spillovers). The spillover (broadly defined as a transfer of managerial 
practices, production methods, marketing techniques or any other knowledge embodied 
in a product or service) may occur through a number of channels.  Local firms may for 
instance learn to imitate a new process or improve the quality of their products or 
services through observation, or find out about better processes or marketing methods 
through interaction with foreign managers in business chambers and from former 
employees of MNEs. Local firms may also benefit from the entry of new professional 
services or suppliers as a result of the MNE entry. Foreign firms may act as catalysts for 
domestic suppliers to improve quality or time efficiency by demanding higher standards. 
On the other hand, foreign firms may have a negative effect on domestic firms’ output 
and efficiency if they “steal” their market or best human capital.  If domestic firms cut 
back production in the face of foreign competition, they may experience a higher average 
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cost as fixed costs are spread over a smaller scale of production (Aitken and Harrison, 
1999).  Similarly, if the best employees leave for foreign firms, efficiency declines. 
Most studies examine “horizontal spillovers” and do so within a production 
function framework.5 The effect of foreign presence on the productivity of domestic 
firms in a given industry is captured by the coefficient on the share of foreign firms’ 
output or employment in that industry.  The evidence from this research is mixed.  Most 
studies of developing countries suggest that the horizontal spillover effect is nil or 
negative (e.g., studies of Morocco by Haddad and Harrison, 1993; Venezuela by Aitken 
and Harrison, 1999; Bulgaria and Romania by Konings, 2000; Russia by Yudaeva et al., 
2003; the Czech Republic by Kosova, 2004; and China by Abraham, Konings and 
Slootmaekers, 2006).6  On the other hand, several studies find positive horizontal 
spillovers in the more developed economies such as the UK (e.g., Haskel et al., 2007) and 
the US (e.g., Keller and Yeaple, 2003).  Hence, this puzzle is of some interest in the 
literature and as we discuss below. 
While studies of horizontal spillovers are numerous, until recently there were few 
empirical studies on vertical spillovers.  This is surprising given the early analysis by Lall 
(1980) of the positive backward linkage effects of foreign firms on the Indian trucking 
industry.7  Moreover, vertical spillovers are more likely to be positive than horizontal 
spillovers since MNEs have an incentive to improve the productivity of their suppliers 
rather than that of their competitors.8  The empirical papers that have appeared recently 
                                                 
5 The literature on FDI spillovers has been burgeoning in recent years. We do not attempt to summarize the 
large and rapidly growing literature, but simply highlight the work that has motivated the analysis in this 
paper.  We refer the interested reader to a survey by Gorg and Greenaway (2003). 
6 In the Chinese case, Abraham, Konings and Slootmaekers (2006) find positive horizontal spillovers for 
certain types of firms. 
7 On the other hand, there are numerous case studies which provide specific examples of how MNEs 
provide training and assistance to their suppliers.  See for example, Moran (2001). 
8Blalock and Gertler (2005) point out that MNEs may establish a relationship with multiple suppliers to 
reduce dependency on a single supplier and that this will then benefit all firms that purchase these vendors’ 
output. Consistent with this view, Lin and Saggi (2005) show theoretically how exclusivity in the 
contractual relationship between a multinational and its local supplier reduces the competition among local 
suppliers and can lower backward linkages and local welfare relative to autarky.  
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do indeed find evidence that is consistent with the view of technology transfer through 
backward linkages in the manufacturing sectors of for example, Hungary (Schoors and 
van der Tol, 2001), Indonesia (Blalock and Gertler, 2005), Lithuania (Javorcik, 2004), 
Czech Republic (Stancik, 2007)  and the United Kingdom (Girma, Gorg and Pisu, 2007). 
However, these studies rely only on a variable that is constructed from input-output tables 
at the industry level, rather than a direct firm-specific measure.  Recently, in a parallel 
study to ours Vacek (2007) uses a firm-specific linkage variable to examine the effect of 
share of sales to multinationals within a small sample of large firms in four two-digit 
NACE manufacturing sectors in the Czech Republic. 
Various factors have been considered to condition the effect of spillovers.  For 
example, a popular hypothesis is that negative horizontal spillovers in developing 
countries are due to the low “absorptive capacity” of domestic firms.  It is argued that the 
larger the technology and human capital gap between the domestic and foreign firms, the 
less likely the domestic firms are able to exploit the potential of spillovers.9 The 
implication is that positive spillovers should be found in more technologically advanced 
firms, sectors or countries. There is some evidence supporting the human capital gap 
hypothesis (e.g., Borensztein, De Gregorio and Lee, 1998, using country level data; 
Blalock and Gertler, 2002, using firm level data) but the evidence with respect to the 
technology gap is mixed. For example, with U.K. plant-level data, Girma, Greenaway 
and Wakelin (2001) find that local firms that are ‘technologically comparable’ to foreign 
firms enjoy greater spillover whereas, Haskel, Pereira and Slaughter (2002), using the 
same micro data conclude that plants further away from the technology frontier gain most 
from foreign presence in their sector (thus supporting Findlay, 1978).  Abraham et al. 
(2006) find no relationship between the gap and spillovers in China.  The findings may 
differ because of different measures in that some studies use labor productivity and others 
                                                 
9 The first paper with this argument is perhaps Cohen and Levinthal (1989).  The reverse hypothesis -- that 
spillovers increase with a larger technology gap -- was put forth earlier by Findlay (1978).  
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total factor productivity. They may also differ because of the methodology used. As 
Girma (2005) points out, it may be necessary to take into account certain threshold 
values. He finds evidence that the productivity benefit from FDI increases with 
absorptive capacity until some threshold level beyond which it becomes less 
pronounced.10  The findings may also differ because other factors are not being taken into 
account.  In their study of China, Abraham et al. (2006) find that if they control for 
structure of ownership, there is a significant effect. Finally, studies that proxy technology 
by the level of R&D consistently find positive horizontal spillovers in the R&D sector 
(see e.g., Kathuria, 2001 using Indian data and Kinoshita, 2000, using data from the 
Czech Republic). 
Sabirianova, Svejnar and Terrell (2005b) use 1992-2000 firm-level data on the 
population of industrial firms in the Czech Republic and Russia and find that the 
productivity gap between domestic and foreign firms is increasing in industries with a 
greater foreign presence.  However, in the Czech Republic this negative horizontal 
spillover effect is diminished and eventually reversed over time, whereas in Russia it 
becomes stronger and is associated with domestic firms falling further behind the 
technology frontier. Since the Czech Republic has been more open to FDI and trade, and 
has adopted a stronger (European Union) rule of law than Russia, Sabirianova et al. 
(2005b) argue that the different pattern in these two countries suggests that spillovers are 
more likely to be positive in environments characterized by competition, rule of law and 
openness to foreign investment and international trade.   
The business environment may affect spillovers through a number of channels.  
Competition may for instance strengthen domestic firms and their ability to absorb 
spillovers.  Thus Moran, Graham and Blomstrom (2005) argue that local firms that sell to 
                                                 
10 We note that the notion of threshold value is also in Borensztein, De Gregorio and Lee, (1998) who 
however argue differently – that a minimum threshold of human capital is needed before a firm can absorb 
FDI spillovers. 
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foreign affiliates in protected markets are often subscale in size and inefficient in 
operation. Several studies also find supporting evidence on the positive impact of 
competition.  For example, Blalock and Gertler (in press) and Abraham et al. (2006) 
show that spillovers are positive only in sectors with more competition in Indonesia and 
China, respectively. However, the relationship between horizontal spillovers and 
competition may not be uniform. For example, Sembenelli and Siotis (2002) find, using 
Spanish data, that only firms in the R&D sector enjoy positive spillovers when there is 
more competition.  Aghion, Burgess, Redding, and Zilibotti (2005) develop a model 
showing that firm responses to liberalization are likely to be heterogeneous, with 
technologically more advanced firms being more likely to respond by investing in new 
technologies and production processes, and find supporting evidence with Indian data.  
Hence, an open and competitive environment may yield different spillover effects 
depending on where the domestic firm is relative to the technological frontier.   
The business environment may also affect the quality of FDI brought into a 
country and hence spillovers.  Foreign affiliates in better business environments are likely 
to bring with them better technology as they are more able to maximize profits and hence 
have more to spill. Or, as Moran, Graham and Blomstrom (2005, p. 372) put it: “Foreign 
investors in countries with domestic content, joint venture and technology sharing 
requirements deploy production technique lagging far behind the frontier in international 
industry.”  
The business environment can also affect the structure of ownership, which has 
been found to be correlated with the quality of FDI. Javorcik and Saggi (2004) for 
instance argue that foreign affiliates that have a higher level of technology tend to be 
wholly owned, rather than joint-ventures, in order to protect their proprietary asset.  A 
joint-venture arrangement may increase the risk for undesired leakages of the MNEs 
technology as the domestic partner may use the inside information in the production of 
other goods for which it does not cooperate with the MNE.  In an environment with 
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inadequate protection of intellectual property rights, MNEs may tend to create wholly-
owned affiliates so as to shelter their technological innovations from being copied. 
Hence, if these hypotheses are correct one will see larger positive spillovers from wholly-
owned foreign firms than from partially-owned foreign firms and the largest spillovers 
from wholly-owned in better business environments.  
3. Data and Methodology 
We use data from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 
(BEEPS), a joint initiative of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) and the World Bank Group.11 The survey was first undertaken in 1999–2000, 
when it was administered to approximately 4,000 enterprises in Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE), Turkey and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to assess the 
environment for private enterprise and business development. The second and third 
rounds of the BEEPS were carried out in 2002 and 2005 on approximately 6,500 and 
7,900 enterprises, respectively, in the same 27 CIS and CEE countries (including 
Turkey). In 2005, the BEEPS instrument was administered to approximately the same 27 
countries covered by the second round of the BEEPS. The questionnaires and sampling 
frames of the 2002 and 2005 BEEPS are very similar (see Appendix for more detail). 
 In this paper we use primarily the 2005 BEEPS survey as it contains data on the 
variables of interest.12  In those cases when we cannot construct rates of change from the 
2005 BEEPS, we construct them by combining information from the 2002 and 2005 
BEEPS data sets. The original 2005 data base contains a total of 7,942 firms, with 200-
600 firms per country. The share of firms in services ranges from 50% to 65% across the 
27 countries. Between two-thirds and three-quarters of the firms have less than 50 
                                                 
11The description of the data draws heavily from Synovate (2005), the report from the firm that 
implemented the BEEPS instrument and provided the EBRD and World Bank with electronic data sets. 
12 The reference year for the 2005 BEEPS is actually 2004 and for the 2002 BEEPS it is 2001.  However, 
for ease of exposition, we simply refer to the year of the survey. 
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employees.  Approximately 10% of the firms are foreign owned and another 10% are 
state owned.  The share of firms that export more than 20% of their output varies widely 
across countries: from 5% in Kazakhstan to 30% in Slovenia.  
In addition to the BEEPS data, we rely on data from input-output tables to 
construct the industry-wide spillover variables.  Since we are only able to obtain recent 
input-output tables for 17 of these economies, we use the BEEPS data for these countries.  
We have attempted to impute values for countries with missing input-output tables by 
using the average values from the two closest neighboring countries but we have found 
that such imputation introduced too much noise in the data. Appendix Table A1 contains 
the country, year and source of our input-output tables. 
To assess the extent and nature of spillovers, we focus on revenue efficiency – 
i.e., how efficiently firms generate sales revenue from inputs of capital, labor and 
materials. By using sales revenues as the dependent variable, we capture total factor 
productivity as well as improvements in pricing, marketing and other aspects of revenue 
generation that are crucial for corporate performance. The reason we use this broader 
measure is that the performance of different types of firms may vary for a number of 
reasons, including differences in their efficiency of generating output from inputs, ability 
to charge high prices due to diverse product quality or marketing, intangible assets and 
the cost of capital, location in highly competitive industries, efficiency of vertical 
integration, and extent of outsourcing.  Our approach explicitly allows for the efficiency 
of different firms to vary on account of any of these factors. Given the dynamic nature of 
globalization, we do not presume that firms are in a technical or economic steady state 
but rather that they are trying to improve their performance by adopting new methods of 
production, importing advanced technologies, launching new products, learning new 
managerial and marketing techniques, and implementing other changes. The extent to 
which firms are able to succeed may of course depend on the legal and institutional 
environment, an issue that we explore in later specifications. 
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We estimate the following Cobb-Douglas baseline regression with pooled data for 
all 17 countries:13  
1 2 3 4 5ln ij j j j i iY Forward Backward Horizontal SalesMNEs Importα α α α αΔ = Δ + Δ + Δ + + +  
6 7 ln ln ln
K L M
i i i i i ij ijExport C K L M Xα α β β β γ ε+ + Δ + Δ + Δ + +  (1) 
where Δ refers to change from 2002 to 2005, i and j index firms and industries (at the 
two-digit NACE level), respectively, and lnY is the log of sales revenues. The three 
industry-specific spillover variables are: Forward and Backward, for forward and 
backward linkages, respectively, and Horizontal, for foreign presence in the same 
industry (described below). The firm-specific spillover variables, which are measured in 
2005 levels, include: SalesMNEs -- the share of a firm’s sales to MNEs,14 Exports -- 
share of sales exported, and Imports – the share of inputs imported. We include a vector 
of variables, C, to control for competition: a dummy, equal to 1 if the firm indicates it 
competes in the national market, 0 otherwise; and three dummy variables for low, 
medium and high elasticity of demand, respectively (with completely inelastic demand 
serving as the base).15 The inputs include: K, capital stock (at replacement value and 
utilization adjusted); L, labor (number of employees) and M, intermediate material input 
(including electricity).  X is a set of country and two digit NACE industry dummy 
variables. The industry dummies are interacted with the inputs in order allow for 
industry-specific production functions.   
Foreign presence in industry j (horizontal linkage) is constructed as is typical in 
the literature:  
                                                 
13 Equation (1) can also be interpreted as a first order approximation for more complicated revenue 
(production) functions.  
14 MNEs is defined here as a firm with 50% or more foreign ownership. 
15 The three levels of the elasticity of demand were computed from answers to the question “If you were to 
raise the price of your good or service by 10% what response would you get?” The respondent had to select 
among the following answers: Our customers would continue to buy from us: a) in the same quantities as 
now (completely inelastic); b) at slightly lower quantities (low); c) at much lower quantities (medium);  


















where si is the share of foreign ownership in firm i.  In our econometric specifications, we 
exclude own output of the firm in computing Horizontal. Since the number of firms per 
industry is in some cases small, the estimate of the foreign presence may be sensitive to 
inclusion of very large firms of either domestic or foreign ownership. To attenuate this 
problem, we censor the size of sales at the median plus/minus three times the inter-
quantile range for a given industry and country.  Finally, we note that the variable is 
constructed with the share of foreign ownership, rather than with a dummy variable 
capturing whether the foreign firm is foreign owned or not.  However, the share of 
foreign ownership is typically over 90%. 
The vertical linkage variables can be interpreted as follows: Forwardj is the 
average share of domestic firms’ inputs in industry j purchased from foreign firms in 
industry h; Backwardj is the average share of domestic firms’ sales in industry j supplied 
to foreign firms in industry h. To avoid confusion, we note that the concept of forward 
and backward linkages is derived from the perspective of the foreign firm.  Specifically, 
foreign owned firms provide backward spillovers to domestic firms when they buy from 
them and forward spillovers when they sell to them. We follow the methodology used by 
Blalock and Gertler (2002), Schoors and van der Tol (2001) and Javorcik (2004) and 
denote jhs as the share of sales of industry j sold to industry h. The shares, taken from the 
latest input-output table available for each country, are only for domestic intermediate 
consumption of goods.  They exclude “own” purchases or sales from industry j. 16 The 
forward and backward linkages are computed as follows: 
j h hj hjh j h j
Forward FP s s
≠ ≠
= ⋅∑ ∑ , (3) 
j h jh jhh j h j
Backward FP s s
≠ ≠
= ⋅∑ ∑ , (4) 
                                                 
16 In this approach we differ from some other studies, e.g., Blalock and Gertler’s (2002), whose linkage 
variable includes purchases from its own sector. 
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where FP is foreign presence (equivalently Horizontal linkage).  
We use firm-level data in the 2005 BEEPS to estimate equation (1) since the 2005 
survey provides information on the growth from 2002 to 2005 in sales, exports, and each 
of the inputs.  We use firm level data from both the 2002 and 2005 BEEPS to construct 
industry level data on changes over time in the three industry level linkage variables, 
Backwardj, Forwardj and Horizontalj.  However, the 2005 BEEPS does not collect 
information on the 2002-2005 changes in two firm level linkage variables -- SalesMNEs 
and Imports – hence, these variables are included as their levels in 2005.  For symmetry 
we do the same for Exports.   
By using firm- rather than just industry-level linkage variables we are able to 
eliminate bias introduced by using aggregate data, reduce measurement error, and exploit 
firm-level variation in linkage variables that is much greater than the industry-level 
variation commonly used in the literature.  Perhaps more importantly, by comparing the 
strength of linkages using firm- and industry-level variables we can assess if the spillover 
is confined to a firm actually supplying an MNE or spread over many firms in a given 
industry.  This is important because as Blalock and Gertler (in press) point out, nearly 
every paper in the literature has used industry-level variables and thus effectively 
“considered FDI to be a measure of available technology ….” 
The fact that 2002-2005 changes are being regressed on 2005 levels (shares) of 
the firm-level linkage variables may lead to biased estimates due to endogeneity of firm-
specific variables. We may find significant effects of firm-specific variables because of 
selection (e.g., MNEs may choose to buy from productive domestic firms) and timing 
(e.g., output growth between 2002 and 2005 may be high because a firm happened to find 
a new market or customer in 2005). 
There are several points to be made with respect to this potential problem.  First, 
we note that the potential reverse causality does not distort estimates of other key 
coefficients in the sense that estimating the regression without these variables does not 
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materially change the coefficients or standard errors on the other variables of interest 
(Backwardj, Forwardj, and Horizontalj).  Hence, even if our estimates of coefficients on 
firm-specific variables were to suffer from endogeneity, our inference based on other 
variables is largely unaffected.  Second, our linkage variables are shares rather than levels 
of exports, imports and sales to MNEs. Because there is no strong a priori reason to 
expect correlation between productivity and composition of sales, large biases due to 
reverse causality are not likely.  Third, within a subsample of about 800 firms for which 
we can create a panel with the 2002 and 2005 survey data, the correlation coefficients 
between the 2002 and 2005 values of Exports, Imports and SalesMNEs, respectively, are 
relatively high -- 0.95, 0.93 and 0.42. These coefficients show considerable persistence; 
especially when one considers that the variables are expressed as shares.  Hence, using 
the 2005 rather than 2002 values should not greatly bias the results because of different 
timing of the firm specific variables.  Furthermore, because export status and other 
linkage variables typically involve sizable fixed costs, they depend on the level of 
productivity rather than on its dynamics.  Since we control for firm-specific fixed effect 
by first-differencing the revenue function, we expect possible biases due to selection 
effects to be small.  Finally, we have estimated our baseline regression (1) on the smaller 
panel subsample using 2002 instead of 2005 values of Exports, Imports and SalesMNEs.  
The advantage of this specification is that the timing of the values of the firm-specific 
variables, combined with the other controls (including the firm fixed effects), practically 
precludes the aforementioned endogeneity problems.  It is reassuring that while the 
coefficients are less significant because of the much smaller sample size and volatile firm 
level data, the point estimates are similar to those for the full sample (compare estimates 
in Table 1 and appendix Table A2). In sum, we recognize the potential problem in the 
BEEPs survey design and note that in the present case the actual problem is likely to be 
limited. 
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There are two additional econometric issues that need to be addressed. One is the 
potential selection issue of FDI.  Foreign firms may for example choose to locate in a 
given country because it has better telecommunications or other infrastructure which is 
also improving the efficiency of domestic firms.  Foreign firms may also select to enter a 
given industry because of opportunities that the econometricians do not observe but 
which improve the efficiency of firms in that industry. We control for this potential 
selection problem by first-differencing and also adding fixed effects for country and 
industry to the first-difference specification. First-differencing removes fixed firm-, 
industry- and country-specific variation such as that brought about by differences in 
infrastructure.  The industry and time dummy variables entered in the first-difference 
specification control for unobservables that may be driving changes in the attractiveness 
of a given country or industry.  
Finally, there is the potential endogeneity of inputs.  It may be argued that the 
inputs are chosen by the firm based on its productivity and not taking this into account 
may bias the estimated coefficients. In order to check if this is a serious problem, we 
estimate a specification that uses the Solow residual as the measure of efficiency:17  
1 2 3 4ij j j j iSolow Forward Backwrd Horizontal SalesMNEsα α α αΔ = Δ + Δ + Δ + +  
      5 6 7i i j ij ijImport Export C Xα α α γ ε+ Δ + + + , (5) 
where ln ln ln lnK L Mij ij j ij j ij j ijSolow Y K L Mβ β β= − − − , with β’s being cost shares that we 
allow to vary by industry and country in the estimation. This approach differs from the 
specification in equation (1) in that it controls for the endogeneity of inputs by placing 
them on the left hand side of the equation.  Naturally, the tradeoff is that to the extent that 
                                                 
17 Several other approaches have been proposed to address endogeneity of inputs, including the Olley-
Pakes (1996) investment proxy estimator, the Blundell-Bond (2000) system GMM estimator, and the 
Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) intermediate input proxy estimator. The methods have various well known 
strengths, limitations and data requirements -- see Ackerberg et al. (2006) for details on identification 
problems of these estimators. For us, the main constraint is, however, the short time span of our sample.  In 
view of the nature of our data, we have opted for the Solow residual method as the best approach since it 
has minimal data requirements and relies on relatively mild assumptions.  
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the assumptions of competition, constant-returns to scale in the revenue function and 
cost-minimization are not met, the cost shares may not reflect the equalization of 
marginal cost and marginal revenue by the firms and the use of cost shares may bias our 
results.    
Given the large sample size of about 4,600 domestic firms with no FDI, we are 
able to estimate equations (1) and (5) separately for firms in the manufacturing and 
service sectors, firms with fewer than 30 employees (small) and more than 30 employees 
(large), firms in existence before these economies became emerging markets in 1990 
(old) and firms created since 1990 (new). This enables us to avoid aggregation bias and 
answer questions that were not analyzed in previous studies.  
The descriptive statistics are presented for all domestic firms as well as for each 
of these six categories in appendix Table A3.  We note that the change in the industry 
level linkage variables (Backward, Forward, and Horizontal) is negative over this period, 
indicating that the share of output produced by foreign firms was falling, or put 
differently, that output of domestic firms was growing more rapidly than that of foreign 
firms.  The share of sales to MNEs rose by 5.7% on average over the three-year period, 
and the growth was faster in large than small firms, and in manufacturing than in 
services. The degree of bribing and the share of managers’ time spent with bureaucrats 
fell over the period by 1% and 4% respectively, however the levels remained relatively 
high with an average of 2.3% of sales spent on bribing and 5.2% of managers’ time spent 
with bureaucrats. 
4. Vertical and Horizontal Spillovers and other Baseline Findings 
The key results from estimating equations (1) and (5) are presented in Tables 1 
and 2, respectively. The findings for efficiency in both the Cobb-Douglas and Solow 
residual estimations are very similar in terms of signs, with the former occasionally 
achieving somewhat higher statistical significance. Given the similarity of results and the 
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fact that the Solow residual is a noisy measure of productivity, we continue with the 
widely used Cobb-Douglas specification. 
Backward spillover: The coefficient estimates based on the industry level input-
output table data are similar in magnitude in the two specifications and overall they point 
to a large positive spillover from supplying to MNEs.  The overall estimates based on all 
firms, reported in columns 1 of Tables 1 and 2, indicate that a one percentage increase in 
sales of domestic firms in a given industry j to foreign firms in a given industry h raises 
the rate of growth of efficiency of domestic firms in industry j by 0.07-0.08%. When 
estimated by firm categories, the coefficient is positive and statistically significant for 
large firms (0.14-0.16) in both models and in the Cobb-Douglas specification also for 
new firms (0.095) and firms in manufacturing (0.09). The coefficients for other 
categories of firms are positive but the standard errors are too large to generate statistical 
significance at conventional test levels. 
Forward Spillover:  The estimated coefficients are positive but statistically 
insignificant. The exceptions are firms in the service sector and old firms in the Solow 
residual equation, which generate significant positive effects. On the whole, our estimates 
in Table 1 and 2 suggest that purchasing from foreign firms (i.e., from industries with a 
higher share of foreign firms) does not provide major efficiency enhancing effects for 
domestic firms. 
Horizontal Spillovers:  The coefficients on this variable are smaller than those on 
the Forward and Backward variables. They are generally positive, but statistically 
significant only for old enterprises and to a lesser extent for service sector firms. These 
findings therefore suggest that firms that compete effectively and benefit from the 
presence of foreign competitors are those that are well established (old) or operate in a 
sector where methods and skills of production are relatively visible and transferable 
(services). The estimated coefficients on old firms and services indicate that a one percent 
increase in the share of foreign firms’ output in a given industry raises the rate of growth 
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of efficiency of old firms in the same industry by 0.06-0.07% and that of service sector 
firms by about 0.05%. 
Sales to MNEs: This firm-specific effect is positive for all categories of firms and 
the point estimate is similar for each firm type across the two specifications. All the 
estimated coefficients are statistically significant in the Cobb-Douglas specification and 
all but two are significant in the Solow model.  A one percent increase in sales to MNEs 
as a share of a firm’s output in 2005 is associated with a 0.05% increase in the growth of 
efficiency in both the Cobb-Douglas and Solow specifications, irrespective of firm-type.  
Thus, supplying foreign firms has a direct effect on the productivity, in addition to the 
indirect effects measured by the industry-level variables.  
Exports: The coefficients on share of sales exported are positive and robust, with 
very similar point estimates for all firm-types across both specifications.  A one percent 
increase in the share of sales that are exported is associated with a 0.06-0.07% increase in 
the rate of growth of efficiency of local firms, with a potentially higher effect on old and 
service sector firms.  The only estimate that is not statistically significant is the effect for 
large firms in the Cobb-Douglas specification. 
 Imports: The effects of importing are not significant for any of the firm 
categories in either specification.  This lack of significance parallels that with respect to 
purchases from MNEs (forward linkage) above.  
Firms that compete in national markets have on average 0.02% faster efficiency 
growth than firms that compete only in local markets.  According to both specifications, 
the effect is statistically significant, irrespective of firm age, in small firms and firms in 
services. We interpret this as indicating that firms that compete in the national markets 
tend to be larger and able to take advantage of economies of scale as well as market 
power for networking and lobbying.  Perhaps they are also able to practice transfer 
pricing/accounting and shift production from one region to another according to demand.   
 18
Elasticity of Demand: Firms that report low, medium and high elasticities of 
demand, compared to the base of completely inelastic demand, have slower growth of the 
efficiency of generating revenue from inputs. The negative point estimate is larger for 
firms reporting medium and high elasticities than those reporting a low value. Since the 
dependent variable is sales revenues rather than physical output, the results suggest that 
firms with inelastic demand (no competition) can increase prices faster than those facing 
higher demand elasticity and that either a) the expected positive effect of competition on 
efficiency is outweighed by a monopoly power pricing effect or b) the Schumpeterian 
view that monopoly power gives firms more resources to innovate and become more 
efficient holds.   
To sum up, the estimates in Tables 1 and 2 suggest that domestic firms that supply 
foreign firms experience a faster rate of increase in efficiency than otherwise identical 
domestic firms that do not supply foreign firms. The effect is more robust in the firm-
specific variables than in the industry-specific variable but its magnitude is of the same 
order in the firm- and industry-specific variables.  Our findings indicate that broadly 
defined spillovers (technology diffusion) are taking place from foreign firms to their 
domestic suppliers. The findings are robust across our specifications and are consistent 
with the evidence in other studies, probably because this is an active transfer of 
knowledge due to the high quality demands placed on domestic firms by MNEs.  On the 
other hand, domestic firms that buy from MNEs (either in the country or outside) or 
compete with MNEs in the same industry do not seem to gain positive spillovers, 
although the signs of the coefficients on Forward and Horizontal tend to be positive.  
There are two exceptions however: Firms in the service sector and old firms have positive 
and significant efficiency gains from buying from MNES (in the Solow residual 
equation) and competing with MNEs (in the Cobb-Douglas equation). We interpret this 
finding as indicating that in general it is more difficult for a domestic firm to gain 
efficiency spillovers from a foreign firm when it is in an upstream or competitive 
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relationship with the MNE, than when it is in a downstream relationship.  In the latter, the 
foreign firm is directly transferring knowledge whereas in the former two, there are no 
incentives to do so.  Hence the imitative spillovers that one would expect from firms 
competing in the same product or service market are more difficult to obtain.  Moreover, 
if domestic firms are purchasing inputs that are relatively high priced, it may reduce gains 
in revenue efficiency.  Alternatively, if they purchase inputs that are not easily 
incorporated into the production process (e.g., because their technology is too different, 
not sufficiently sturdy, etc.), this could reduce efficiency gains.18  In future research it 
will be of interest to investigate why service sector and old firms are able to gain these 
spillovers.  Domestic firms in the service sector may for instance be better than those in 
manufacturing at using and imitating foreign firms’ technology if the gestation period of 
the investment in services is shorter and they are able to be more agile in correcting errors 
in the next round of investment.  Similarly old firms may be more able to learn and use 
foreign firms’ technology to improve their revenue efficiency if they have better access to 
capital than new firms.   
5.  The Effect of Business Environment and Quality of FDI on Spillovers  
As noted above, differences between countries’ spillover gains may be caused by 
differences in the business environment (institutions) and the quality of FDI entering the 
country. In this section we explore these effects.  
Moran et al. (2005) as well as others argue that a country with better intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) and more openness to market competition and FDI attracts higher 
quality FDI  because by being unconstrained the foreign firms optimize and bring in the 
latest technology. Conversely, countries that have poor protection of property rights, 
impose restrictions on ownership or require technology sharing attract FDI with a lower 
                                                 
18  For example, the failure of the Polish experiment to boost productivity of its firms through the 
importation western technology because they were unable to us it is infamous (see, e.g., Terrell, 1992). 
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level of technology. Branstetter, Fisman and Foley (2006) have shown that US 
multinationals respond to changes in IPR regimes in host countries by increasing 
technology transfer significantly to reforming countries.  Their analysis does not consider 
the impact on reforming countries but presumably increased technology transfer should 
lead to greater efficiency in domestic firms interacting with the MNEs.  
Since firms tend to guard their proprietary assets, several studies have concluded 
that foreign investors are more likely to transfer better technology within wholly owned 
multinationals subsidiaries than in joint ventures or licensees (e.g., Javorcik and 
Spartareanu, 2003). Others have shown that in countries with limited rule of law, MNEs 
tend to shy away from joint-ownership and choose to invest in wholly-owned ventures 
(e.g., McCalman, 2004 and Smarzynska and Wei, 2002 who study impact of intellectual 
property rights and corruption, respectively, on mode of entry).   
Another factor that may affect spillovers is the origin of foreign investors. It could 
be argued that FDI from more developed countries is likely have a higher level of 
technology than FDI from less advanced countries.19 Hence, domestic firms that are able 
to grasp this technology will gain more, all other things equal.   
Overall, this reasoning and evidence suggests that there should be higher quality 
FDI in countries with better business environments (i.e., less corruption or better rule of 
law), firms that are wholly-owned by foreign investors and in FDI that comes from more 
developed countries. Higher quality FDI should yield greater spillovers, ceteris paribus. 
In our tests, we compare the spillover effects of FDI: a) in different business 
environments, b) from wholly-owned (v. partially-owned) foreign firms, and c) from 
OECD v. non-OECD countries.  However, it should also be noted that in a) and b), the 
higher quality FDI is motivated by better protection of its proprietary assets. Hence, 
                                                 
19 The origin of FDI may matter for spillovers for other reasons as well.  If multinationals further from the 
host country tend to source more from the host than FDI from countries closer to the host or if FDI 
included within a preferential trade agreement has more access than FDI outside the trade bloc, one might 
expect greater spillovers (an argument put forth by Javorcik, Saggi and Spatarenu, 2004).   
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spillovers may not be larger because it is also more difficult to imitate or reverse engineer 
the technology of a foreign firm when, for example, the domestic firm is in an 
environment where intellectual property rights are protected.   
We start by testing whether vertical and horizontal spillovers vary systematically 
with different business environments. The BEEPS survey offers a unique opportunity to 
examine the impact of the characteristics of the business environment because it not only 
has a rich set of variables that capture these factors but, importantly, this information is 
collected at the firm level. Moreover, BEEPS has large cross-country variation that is 
usually absent in other studies.  In testing for the effect of the business environment on 
the strength of spillovers, it is useful to rewrite our baseline specification as 
ln ij ij i ij ijY Z Xα β γ εΔ = ⋅ ΔΛ + ⋅ Δ + +  (6) 
where ln ijYΔ  is growth rate of sales revenue from 2002 to 2005, Λ  is the vector of 
either industry or firm specific linkage variables, Z is a vector of inputs and X is a set of 
other controls such as industry and country dummies. Coefficients α  measure the 
strength of linkages.  
Let G be a vector of variables that captures institutions/business environment. To 
capture the effect of G on productivity and the strength of spillovers, we modify our 
baseline specification (6) and estimate the following regression  
ln ij ij j ij j i ij ijY G G Z Xα θ ψ β γ εΔ = ⋅ ΔΛ + ⋅ Δ ⋅ ΔΛ + ⋅ Δ + ⋅ Δ + + . (7) 
Among the many variables in the BEEPS that measure the business environment, 
we consider the following two: 1) Bribe (corruption) measured as the percentage of total 
annual sales typically paid in unofficial payments/gifts to public officials; and 2) 
Bureaucratic red tape, proxied by the percentage of management’s time spent with 
officials. One would expect spillovers to be more positive when there is less bureaucratic 
tape or corruption because this will attract higher quality FDI and perhaps because 
domestic firms in these environments will allocate more resources to be able to absorb 
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technology spillovers. These two variables are constructed by averaging the responses for 
all the firms in the industry and country in which the firm is located.   
We provide separate estimates of the effects of corruption and bureaucratic tape 
on spillovers in Tables 3 and 4, respectively.  Within each table we also report separate 
estimates of the effect of the institution on spillovers measured by the industry-specific 
variable (Panel A) and the firm-specific linkage variable (Panel B).   
As may be seen from Panel A of Table 3, the estimates obtained from interacting 
the 2002-2005 rate of change in the intensity of corruption, measured by the Bribe 
variable, with the 2002-2005 change in the forward, backward and horizontal linkage 
variables do not reveal any systematic patterns.  The coefficients tend to be negative but 
are not significant except for a dampening effect that an increase in bribes has on 
horizontal spillovers to small firms. The finding that small firms would be more 
negatively affected by MNE presence/competition in more corrupt environments is 
plausible. It is notable, however, that with this one exception, an increase in the intensity 
of corruption (Bribe) has neither a direct nor an interactive effect on the rate of change of 
efficiency of any other type of domestic firms.  The firm-specific estimates in Panel B of 
Table 3 are consistent with those in Panel A in showing that corruption does not seem to 
strongly affect vertical spillovers. The only significant negative effect is on large firms 
selling to MNEs.  Interestingly the magnitude of the coefficient for the similar industry 
variable (interaction between Bribe and Backward) is also greatest for large firms 
although it is not significant.   
Table 4 shows the effects of bureaucratic red tape (the percentage of manager’s 
time spent with officials) on vertical and horizontal spillovers using the industry- and 
firm-specific variables in Panels A and B, respectively.  The coefficients in both panels 
indicate that an increase in the time spent with officials tends to dampen spillovers to 
upstream firms (i.e., Backward, SalesMNEs, but not Exports), as the coefficients are 
negative, but only significant for small and old firms (for Backward) and large and 
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service sector firms (for SalesMNEs). On the other hand, large firms and those 
established before 1991 tend to benefit in terms of revenue efficiency from an increased 
presence of foreign firms in their industry (Horizontal) and the benefit rises with greater 
interaction with government officials (Panel A). In these situations, the time spent with 
officials may not reflect the burden of red tape, but rather the net effect of the ability of 
managers to obtain better terms for doing their business.  Finally, we consistently find 
there are no spillovers to downstream domestic firms (Forward and Imports), with the 
exception for firms in the service sector (and old firms thought not significant at 
conventional levels in this specification), and spending time with managers does not 
improve or detract from this.  
The specification in equation (7) is of course very demanding on the data because 
it identifies all effects only from the 2002-2005 variation and does not exploit the sizable 
cross-country and cross-industry variation at a given point in time. We have therefore 
also estimated a specification that exploits the level rather than rate of change of 
corruption.  In particular, we have revised equation (7) to include the 2002 levels of the 
institutional variables as follows: 
2002 2002ln ij ij j ij j i ij ijY G G Z Xα θ ψ β γ εΔ = ⋅ ΔΛ + ⋅ ⋅ ΔΛ + ⋅ + ⋅ Δ + + .  (8) 
When we estimate equation (8), the estimates of θ  and ψ (not reported here) are not 
significantly different from zero for the 2002 levels of bribe or manager’s time.  
Since the role of institutions is generally considered to be very important, we have 
proceeded with additional lines of investigation. We examine whether the business 
environment variables have a systematic effect when they are measured at the country 
level rather than at the industry and country level.  This corresponds to the notion that the 
effect of corruption and other institutional features in a given country has a uniform effect 
on all firms rather than affecting firms in some industries more than those in others.  We 
therefore calculate new 2002 measures of bribe and manager’s time as the average 
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responses to these two respective questions by all firms in a given country. We rank the 
17 countries by each of these two indicators and divide them into three groups for each 
indicator. Next we estimate a specification that interacts each of these categorical 
variables of corruption (managers’ time) with the three linkage variables.  The results 
(not reported here) indicate that there is no systematic effect.  Using country-level 
indicators, we hence cannot find any evidence of an effect of the business environment in 
terms of the level of corruption or bureaucratic red tape on the strength of spillovers.  
Given that specific institutional indicators do not generate systematic effects, we 
next explore the effects of business environment implicitly in a broader (regional) 
context. In particular, we re-estimate the baseline specification (equation 1) separately for 
four groups of countries that are viewed as having relatively similar institutional 
structures within groups but considerable differences between groups: 1) Commonwealth 
of Independent States or CIS (represented in our sample by Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia, 
and Ukraine); 2) Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania); 3) Central and Eastern 
Europe or CEE (represented by Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia); and 4) 
South-Eastern Europe or SEE (represented by Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, 
Slovenia). These estimates are reported in Table 5. Since each regression is based on a 
smaller number of observations than the earlier estimates based on the entire sample, 
many coefficients are estimated less precisely than in the previous regressions based on 
the full sample. Indeed, none of the industry-level measures of backward, forward and 
horizontal linkages produces a significant effect, except for a positive effect of a 
horizontal linkage in SEE.  The firm-specific linkage variables have more significance 
and suggest that the positive efficiency effects of the firm-specific share of sales to MNEs 
(salesMNEs) and share of exports in sales (Exports) in the overall regression are driven 
primarily by firms in the CIS and CEE regions. Given the wide gap in these regions’ 
development and business environments, this finding again suggests that there is not a 
significant effect of the environmental factors on spillovers.  Moreover, importing has a 
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diverse effect across the regions, increasing efficiency in the Baltics and reducing it in 
SEE. We conclude that whereas the findings do vary by region, they are not 
systematically correlated with the level of development.  
Next, to test the hypotheses regarding the strength of spillovers and quality of FDI 
as proxied by degree of foreign ownership (whole v. partial) and country of origin of the 
FDI, we re-estimate equation (1) with new variables for the backward, forward, and 
horizontal linkages. The foreign presence variable, FPj, is recalculated for share of output 
by wholly-owned foreign firms v. partially-owned ones and for share of output produced 
by FDI from OECD countries v. non-OECD countries. Specifically, we estimate 
  
  ln whole partialij W ij P ij i ij ijY Z Xα α β γ εΔ = ⋅ ΔΛ + ⋅ ΔΛ + ⋅ Δ + + ,                                   (9) 
 
where wholeijΛ  is a vector of linkage variables computed according to equations (2)-(4) 
with si = 1 in (2) -- i.e., linkage variables for wholly owned firms only, and partialijΛ
 
is a vector of linkage variables computed according to (2)-(4) with si < 1 in (2) -- i.e., 
linkage variables for partially owned firms only.  The findings for these proxies of the 
“quality of FDI” are presented in Table 6.   
As may be seen from Panel A of Table 6, apart from the backward linkages one 
cannot reject the hypothesis that the linkage coefficients for wholly and partially owned 
foreign firms are pair-wise identical. As to the backward linkage, the positive effect 
observed on the entire sample earlier appears to be driven by firms with partial foreign 
ownership (especially those that are large and new), suggesting that the combination of 
local and foreign know-how is superior to the know-how generated by foreign ownership 
alone.  
The results in Panel B of Table 6 indicate that FDI from advanced economies 
does not uniformly lead to higher efficiency spillovers than FDI from less developed 
 26
countries. On the contrary, FDI from developing countries has a stronger positive effect 
more often than FDI from advanced economies. Thus FDI from OECD results in a 
positive backward linkage effect among new firms and those in services, while FDI from 
non-OECD has a positive forward linkage effect among large firms, old firms and in the 
sample as a whole. Non-OECD FDI has a positive forward linkage effect in large firms, 
old firms and those in services, while OECD FDI does not have a positive linkage effect 
for any category of firms. Finally, one cannot reject the hypothesis that the horizontal 
linkage effect of OECD and non-OECD FDI is the same for all categories of firms except 
the old firms, where the non-OECD FDI registers a strong positive linkage effect, while 
the corresponding effect of OECD FDI is insignificant. 
The estimates in Table 6 indicate that for the most part there appears to be no 
systematic difference in productivity spillovers from wholly v. partially owned foreign 
firms or from FDI from OECD v. non-OECD countries. If anything spillovers are more 
frequently greater for FDI in partially (rather than wholly) owned foreign firms and FDI 
from non-OECD rather than OECD countries. Hence, neither the conjecture that wholly-
owned foreign firms have higher levels of technology than partially-owned ones, nor the 
conjecture that the quality of FDI from OECD countries is better than that from non-
OECD countries are be borne out in terms of the estimated spillover effects.  However, 
we recognize that spillovers may not be greater the higher the quality/technology of FDI 
if the foreign firm is better able to protect its proprietary asset or if local firms are not 
able to absorb them.  Hence, for example, the lower level technology in the non-OECD 
FDI may be more easily absorbed in these countries.  Another story consistent with these 
findings would be that the OECD FDI is better able to protect its proprietary assets than 
non-OECD FDI.  We are not able to distinguish between these hypotheses with our data 
However, we can pursue this issue further by carrying out tests of whether 
spillovers vary systematically by the interaction of wholly and partially foreign owned 
firms and host country environment.  In doing so, we use the country level variable for 
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corruption and manager’s time spent with government officials. We rank countries in the 
top v. bottom half of the distribution of each of these two variables and we interact the 
two variables with the spillover and wholly v. partially owned variables. In our estimates 
(not reported here), we do not find any of the coefficients of interest to be significant.   
6.  “Absorptive Capacity” of the Firm and Spillovers  
A popular hypothesis in the literature is that the extent to which local firms 
benefit from FDI spillovers depends on the level of their technology (efficiency) or 
human capital. As noted earlier, there are two opposing views in the FDI spillover 
literature with respect the impact of a firm’s distance to the efficiency frontier on 
spillovers.  In a series of recent papers, Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2002) and 
Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt (2005) use a Schumpeterian model to 
predict that firms that are close to the efficiency frontier benefit more from foreign 
presence than firms that are far from the frontier. Melitz (2003) obtains similar results 
although in his model foreign presence has only general equilibrium effects.  
The empirical problem for testing the hypothesis with respect to the ‘efficiency or 
technology gap’ is that the level of efficiency is not observed and thus it is hard to 
compute the distance to the frontier at the firm level.20 We tackle this problem in the 
following way. Since there is substantial evidence that foreign firms are more efficient 
than domestic firms in the developing countries, we assume that foreign firms embody 
the efficiency frontier. Firms that are similar to foreign firms along observed 
characteristics are likely to have efficiency (technology) that is close to that of the 
foreign-owned counterparts. If observed characteristics of domestic firms are different 
from observed characteristic of the foreign-owned firms, the domestic firms are likely to 
use a technology different from the technology used by foreign-owned firms. At the 
                                                 
20 We do not use stochastic frontier analysis because the distance from the frontier interacted with other 
variables is correlated with the residual, which includes the level of technology.  
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minimum, one can interpret this difference as the distance from the business practice of 
foreign-owned firms.  
To construct such a metric of discrepancy, we draw on the literature on matching 
(e.g., Rosembaum 2002). Specifically, we use the Mahalanobis distance, i.e., the distance  
 
of domestic firm i to a foreign firm as measured by 1 1/ 2min{( ) ( )}D F D Fi i j x i jj Fd x x S x x
−
∈
′= − −  
where x are observed characteristics, F and D denote foreign-owned and domestic 
companies and Sx is the covariance matrix of the vector of observed characteristics x. We 
take the minimum over all possible distances since efficiency/technology (business 
practices and models) can vary across foreign-owned firms.  
The vector of observed characteristics contains the logarithm of capital stock and 
number of employees, structure of the employment (educational attainment in terms of  
number of employees that completed primary school, vocational school, secondary 
school, or college; and skill level in terms of number of employees that are managers, 
skilled workers, unskilled workers, or professional employees), type of location (capital, 
large city, mediums-size city, town), industry (NACE 2-digit level), export status 
(Yes/No), and country. We match firms by industry and country exactly, i.e., domestic 
firms can be matched only to foreign-owned firms in the same industry and country. 
Since the distance is strongly skewed, we take log(1 )i iDistance d≡ + as the distance 
from the frontier in our specification.  
To test the hypothesis that distance to the frontier affects the strength of 
spillovers, we modify the baseline specification (1) in a manner similar to the 
modification that tests for the effects of institutions:   
 ln ij ij i ij i i ij ijY Distance Distance Z Xα θ ψ β γ εΔ = ⋅ ΔΛ + ⋅ ⋅ ΔΛ + + ⋅ Δ + + .  (10)  
The effect of distance on the strength of vertical and horizontal linkages is captured by 
the coefficient on the interaction of Distance with linkage Λ .  
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The key findings on the efficiency gap are reported in Table 7. The coefficients 
on Distance are consistent with the theoretical prediction by showing that domestic firms 
that are further away from foreign firms are less efficient in generating revenue from 
inputs than firms that are closer to foreign firms. Coefficients on the interactions of 
distance and linkages are also by and large negative, suggesting that firms that are further 
from foreign firms tend to have smaller horizontal and vertical spillovers, but the 
coefficients are only statistically significant for backward spillovers in old firms and 
horizontal spillovers in manufacturing.21 The prediction that firms that are close to the 
technological frontier benefit more from foreign presence than firms that are far from the 
technological frontier hence receives only limited statistical support in our data and is 
consistent with the diverse findings in the literature and the non-findings by Abraham, 
Konings, and Slootmaeker (2006) for China.   
Finally, the effect of education measured as the share of workers with a university 
or higher education, reported in Table 8,  indicates that firms with more educated workers 
do indeed tend to be more efficient, although when split by firm type the coefficient is 
statistically significant only for firms that are small, new and in services. The coefficient 
on the interaction terms of education and linkages are by and large insignificant, implying 
that domestic firms with a more educated workforce are not better able to absorb 
spillovers than those with a less educated workforce. 
 
7. Summary and Conclusions 
Using data from 17 emerging market economies, we advance our understanding 
of the magnitude of vertical and horizontal spillovers of multinational enterprises 
                                                 
21 Kathuria (2000) has measured technical efficiency as the distance between the local firm and the most 
efficient firm in the industry using data from 1975/76 to 1988/89 in India; he finds that foreign presence 
leads to increased dispersion of efficiency in the industry over time.  Whereas the independent variable is 
similar the Mahalanobis distance, the outcome variable (dispersion in efficiency) differs.  One can interpret 
this as a negative spillover. 
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(MNEs) on the efficiency of domestic firms by (i) estimating the direct backward 
spillover of MNEs on firms that sell to MNEs, in addition to estimating the usual 
industry-level spillover on all firms, (ii) providing much larger comparative evidence 
than other studies, (iii) generating estimates not only for manufacturing but also for 
services, (iv) analyzing not only large but also small firms that tend to be the new 
entrepreneurs and engines of growth, (v) using a broader measure of efficiency than other 
studies by analyzing how efficiently firms generate sales revenue, taking into account 
inputs of capital, labor and materials, (vi) including in the analysis of vertical spillovers 
the concept of selling or buying from outside of the country, (vii) shedding light on the 
impact of a country’s institutions/business environment on the strength of vertical and 
horizontal spillovers, and (viii) testing whether FDI from more v. less advanced countries 
and FDI in the form of a wholly foreign-owned firms versus joint ventures has larger 
spillovers, and (ix) addressing the question of whether the efficiency/technology or 
human capital gap of local firms relative to foreign firms affects the strength of 
spillovers.  
In our baseline estimates we provide support for the findings of recent single-
country studies that there are positive backward spillovers on efficiency, using an 
industry-level variable based on input-output tables. We extend these findings by 
showing that our firm-specific measure of backward spillovers (SalesMNEs) generates 
significant positive effects among virtually all categories of firms, while the industry-
level measure used in existing studies generates significant estimates only in large firms, 
new firms and firms in manufacturing.  Hence, we present an important finding that 
spillovers from FDI have a direct and indirect component in the sense that interaction 
with foreign firms benefits a given domestic firm through its direct interaction with a 
foreign firm and indirectly through the interactions of other domestic firms with MNEs. 
Future firm-level surveys should incorporate more questions on the vertical relationships 
between foreign and domestic firms in order to capture spillovers more precisely. 
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Our finding that forward and horizontal spillovers are usually insignificant is also 
in line with the bulk of the literature and consistent with the notion that these types of 
spillovers should be less likely to occur than backward spillovers. However, we do find 
that these two types of spillovers are positive and significant for firms in the service 
sector and old firms, which deserves further research.  It suggests that firms that benefit 
from the presence of foreign competitors and from supplying MNEs are those that are 
well established (old) or operate in a sector where methods and skills of production are 
relatively visible (services).   
The coefficients on share of sales exported are usually positive and significant, 
while the effects of importing are not significant for any of the firm categories in either 
specification.  These two results parallel the above significance of sales to MNEs and 
general lack of significance with respect to purchases from MNEs. Hence, we identify a 
pattern that supplying a foreign firm, whether in the host country or outside of the 
country, has knowledge spillover effects whereas purchasing from foreign firms, 
domestically or from abroad, in general does not.  
Our analysis of the performance effects of key institutional variables focuses on 
bribes (corruption) to public officials and regulatory burden as measured by the time that 
top management spends with public officials.  We find that by and large these aspects of 
the business environment do not have the negative effects on performance predicted by 
recent authors.  Corruption does not have a direct or indirect effect on efficiency of 
domestic firms.  It is possible that the insignificant results are being driven by two 
competing forces: a) bribes are enabling domestic firms to be able to be more efficient 
(“greasing the wheels”) v. b) bribes are increasing the costs of doing business and driving 
some firms out of business.  Counter to our hypothesis, we find that the time that a top 
manager spends with bureaucrats actually has a positive effect on the firm’s efficiency in 
manufacturing, and strengthens horizontal spillovers in large firms and in old firms. In 
these situations, the time spent with officials may not reflect the burden of red tape, but 
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rather the net effect of the ability of managers to obtain better terms for doing their 
business. We also detect a negative effect obtained for small and old firms with respect to 
the interaction of the change in the backward linkage and the change in time management 
spends with government officials. This suggests that for these firms the time spent with 
officials may on the net detract from the time managers need to raise their ability to sell 
to the increasingly more present MNEs. Nevertheless, our findings that key measures of 
institutions/business environment have surprisingly little effect on firm efficiency – 
directly or indirectly through spillovers – raises issues about the magnitude of their effect 
v. the researchers’ ability to measure them.  
We also test for the hypothesis that firms with higher quality FDI provide greater 
spillovers to domestic firms.  Following the literature, we assume that wholly foreign-
owned firms have higher quality than partially foreign-owned firms and that FDI from 
more advanced (OECD) countries is of higher quality, and hence yields more positive 
spillovers, than FDI from less advanced (non-OECD) countries. We also test whether 
spillovers are greatest from wholly foreign-owned firms in good host country business 
environments (less corruption and less manager’s time spent with government officials) 
and smallest from partially-owned firms in poor host country business environments. We 
find no systematic support for any of these hypotheses. If anything, spillovers are more 
frequently greater for FDI in partially (rather than wholly) foreign-owned firms and FDI 
from non-OECD rather than OECD countries.  We recognize that this finding could be 
due to the fact that leakages may be greater from partially-foreign-owned than in wholly-
foreign-owned.  Moreover, the “higher level of technology” may not be the “appropriate 
technology” for firms in these countries, given their stage of development, a concept 
discussed in the development literature in the 1970s (see e.g., Sen, 1975).  Hence, 
domestic firms are able to use/imitate the technology of the non-OECD countries more 
readily. 
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We contribute to the large literature testing whether firms that are closer to the 
efficiency/technological frontier or have a higher level of human capital benefit more 
from foreign presence, by examining the impact of these two variables on vertical as well 
horizontal spillovers and by using a new measure of distance to the frontier. We find that 
distance from the frontier tends to dampen the horizontal and vertical spillovers but it is 
only significant for horizontal spillovers in manufacturing and backward spillovers in old 
firms. Finally, our results indicate that whereas domestic firms with a more educated 
workforce are more efficient, they are not better able to absorb spillovers compared to 
firms with a less educated workforce.  This could be the result of the measure of 
education including only university educated when other types of degrees, which we 
could not capture (e.g., technical “high schools”), are important for absorptive capacity.22  
In sum, while the literature in this area often reports insignificant effects, we find 
some significant effects across the board (e.g., selling to MNEs and exporting) and show 
that other significant effects are detectable in specific categories of firms or in non-linear 
(interactive) specifications.  Our analysis points to the need for future research to take 
into account heterogeneous spillover effects. It also highlights the value of having firm-
level linkage variables in addition to the usual industry-level measures.  
                                                 
22 However, Gorodnichenko, Svejnar and Terrell (2007) find that the share of university educated is an 
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LARGE SMALL MNFG SERVICES OLD NEW 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Δ Backward 0.075** 0.144** 0.033 0.090* 0.077 0.072 0.095** 
 (0.038) (0.057) (0.053) (0.055) (0.063) (0.068) (0.047) 
Δ Forward 0.035 0.026 0.037 0.023 0.108 0.075 0.020 
 (0.035) (0.052) (0.047) (0.050) (0.070) (0.081) (0.038) 
Δ Horizontal 0.020 0.031 0.008 0.009 0.052* 0.061** 0.004 
 (0.016) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.031) (0.031) (0.018) 
Share of sales to MNEs 0.047*** 0.051*** 0.042* 0.036* 0.049** 0.060** 0.040** 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.023) (0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.017) 
Export share 0.056*** 0.030 0.055** 0.060*** 0.077*** 0.068** 0.050*** 
 (0.014) (0.020) (0.022) (0.016) (0.027) (0.028) (0.017) 
Import share -0.009 0.013 -0.016 -0.013 -0.009 -0.009 -0.007 
 (0.008) (0.014) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.018) (0.009) 
Compete in national markets  0.022*** 0.011 0.022*** 0.006 0.033*** 0.025* 0.019*** 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.007) 
Elasticity of demand        
Low -0.027*** -0.026** -0.029*** -0.011 -0.035*** -0.001 -0.035*** 
 (0.007) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.008) 
Medium -0.041*** -0.044*** -0.040*** -0.028** -0.051*** -0.038** -0.040*** 
 (0.008) (0.014) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.009) 
High  -0.042*** -0.037*** -0.046*** -0.027** -0.065*** -0.050*** -0.038*** 
 (0.008) (0.013) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.009) 
Observations 4981 1714 3267 1975 2293 1264 3717 
R-squared 0.60 0.61 0.60 0.65 0.57 0.57 0.62 
 
 
Note: The table reports the estimated effects on revenue efficiency using a Cobb-Douglas 
function, where the dependent variables is growth rate of sales revenues; the independent 
variables include the growth rate of three inputs (utilization adjusted capital, number of 
employees and materials), country and industry fixed effects, and the reported variables. See text 
for definition of variables. Large firms are defined as firms with more than 30 employees. MNFG 
= manufacturing firms according to NACE classification. OLD firms are defined as firms 
established before 1991.  NEW firms are established in 1991 or after 1991.  Benchmark group for 
the elasticity of demand is “inelastic”.  Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses; * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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LARGE SMALL MNFG SERVICES OLD NEW 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Δ Backward 0.071 0.157** 0.023 0.059 0.096 0.071 0.090 
 (0.045) (0.067) (0.062) (0.067) (0.075) (0.081) (0.055) 
Δ Forward 0.039 0.055 0.022 0.027 0.161** 0.196** -0.001 
 (0.041) (0.064) (0.054) (0.061) (0.082) (0.091) (0.046) 
Δ Horizontal 0.016 0.043 -0.001 0.017 0.051 0.071** -0.002 
 (0.018) (0.026) (0.024) (0.027) (0.035) (0.034) (0.022) 
Share of sales to MNEs 0.048*** 0.036 0.058** 0.027 0.049* 0.057* 0.044** 
 (0.017) (0.022) (0.026) (0.023) (0.029) (0.031) (0.020) 
Export share 0.076*** 0.072*** 0.060** 0.100*** 0.080*** 0.107*** 0.059*** 
 (0.016) (0.022) (0.026) (0.018) (0.030) (0.029) (0.020) 
Import share -0.009 0.008 -0.014 -0.013 -0.009 -0.029 -0.002 
 (0.010) (0.016) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.019) (0.011) 
Compete in national markets 0.026*** 0.005 0.031*** 0.008 0.043*** 0.024 0.024*** 
 (0.007) (0.012) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.008) 
Elasticity of demand        
Low -0.031*** -0.026* -0.033*** -0.003 -0.043*** 0.004 -0.043*** 
 (0.008) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.017) (0.010) 
Medium  -0.037*** -0.042*** -0.035*** -0.023 -0.047*** -0.031 -0.038*** 
 (0.010) (0.016) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.011) 
High -0.041*** -0.018 -0.051*** -0.014 -0.076*** -0.032* -0.043*** 
 (0.009) (0.015) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013) (0.019) (0.010) 
Observations 4991 1716 3275 1979 2297 1267 3724 
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.04 
 
Note: The table reports the estimated effects on revenue efficiency using the Solow residual, 
where the dependent variables is the growth rate of sales revenues; the independent variables 
include the rates of change of three inputs (utilization adjusted capital, number of employees and 
materials) whose cost shares are allowed to vary by industry, as well as country and industry 
fixed effects, and the reported variables. See text for definition of variables. Large firms are 
defined as firms with more than 30 employees. MNFG = manufacturing firms according to 
NACE classification. OLD firms are defined as firms established before 1991.  NEW firms are 
established in 1991 or after 1991.  Benchmark group for the elasticity of demand is “inelastic”.  
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 





Table 3: Effect of Bribes on Strength of Spillovers and Revenue Efficiency 
 
 ALL LARGE SMALL MNFG SERV OLD NEW 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Panel A: Industry Level Linkages 
Δ Backward 0.084** 0.140** 0.045 0.089 0.098 0.093 0.102** 
 (0.039) (0.060) (0.054) (0.057) (0.066) (0.072) (0.048) 
Δ Forward 0.026 0.032 0.028 0.039 0.072 0.069 0.007 
 (0.042) (0.068) (0.053) (0.071) (0.077) (0.096) (0.046) 
Δ Horizontal 0.020 0.041* 0.002 0.008 0.039 0.072** 0.004 
 (0.016) (0.023) (0.021) (0.023) (0.030) (0.032) (0.018) 
Δ Backward * Δ Bribe 0.393 -1.308 0.868 -0.050 1.242 -1.161 1.287 
 (1.664) (2.368) (2.437) (2.575) (3.595) (3.026) (2.057) 
Δ Forward * Δ Bribe -0.803 0.696 -1.135 0.583 -3.905 -0.922 -1.044 
 (1.263) (1.695) (1.935) (1.718) (3.399) (2.806) (1.406) 
Δ Horizontal * Δ Bribe -0.608 0.943 -1.515** -0.475 -0.350 -0.513 -0.470 
 (0.613) (0.767) (0.750) (1.059) (1.194) (1.174) (0.741) 
Δ Bribe 0.118 0.306 -0.044 0.131 0.035 0.426 0.148 
 (0.146) (0.221) (0.191) (0.293) (0.197) (0.298) (0.169) 
Observations 4972 1710 3262 1973 2289 1261 3711 
R-squared 0.60 0.62 0.60 0.65 0.57 0.57 0.62 
        
Panel B: Firm Level Linkages 
Sales to MNEs     0.039** 0.039** 0.036 0.031 0.041* 0.051** 0.031 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.028) (0.026) (0.022) (0.023) (0.021) 
Exports 0.063*** 0.040* 0.062** 0.075*** 0.083*** 0.090*** 0.052*** 
 (0.016) (0.023) (0.025) (0.021) (0.029) (0.033) (0.019) 
Imports -0.010 0.014 -0.018 -0.024 -0.008 -0.002 -0.010 
 (0.009) (0.016) (0.011) (0.015) (0.014) (0.018) (0.011) 
SMNEs* ΔBribe -0.947 -1.462** -0.509 -0.654 -0.936 -1.106 -0.914 
 (0.672) (0.728) (1.191) (1.123) (0.889) (1.412) (0.828) 
Exports * ΔBribe 0.550 0.694 0.608 0.976 0.640 1.068 0.140 
 (0.518) (0.764) (0.720) (0.936) (0.583) (0.878) (0.643) 
Imports * ΔBribe -0.016 0.133 -0.122 -0.723 0.176 0.923 -0.185 
 (0.322) (0.460) (0.437) (0.541) (0.478) (0.598) (0.383) 
Δ Bribe 0.137 0.249 -0.005 0.341 0.013 0.140 0.235 
 (0.180) (0.267) (0.242) (0.333) (0.242) (0.361) (0.208) 
Observations 4972 1710 3262 1973 2289 1261 3711 
R-squared 0.60 0.62 0.60 0.65 0.57 0.57 0.62 
 
Note: The table reports the estimated spillover effects on revenue efficiency using the 
specification in equation (8) in the paper.  The bribe variable is constructed as the sum of the 
answers to the following two questions: 1) “On average, what percent of total annual sales do 
firm’s like yours typically pay in unofficial payments/gifts to public officials?”; 2) “When firms 
in your industry do business with the government, what percent of the contract value would be 
typically paid in additional or unofficial payments/gifts to secure the contract?”  To reduce noise, 
we use the average value of bribes in a given industry and country.  Robust clustered standard 
errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 4: Effect of Manager’s Time Spent with Officials on Strength of Spillovers and 
Revenue Efficiency 
 ALL LARGE SMALL MNFG SERV OLD NEW 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Panel A: Industry Level Linkages 
Δ Backward 0.060 0.131** -0.007 0.086 0.041 0.014 0.101** 
 (0.039) (0.057) (0.057) (0.060) (0.072) (0.073) (0.049) 
Δ Forward 0.044 0.025 0.064 0.021 0.155* 0.122 0.018 
 (0.036) (0.051) (0.050) (0.053) (0.080) (0.085) (0.039) 
Δ Horizontal 0.025 0.055** 0.002 0.024 0.050 0.097*** -0.002 
 (0.017) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.032) (0.033) (0.020) 
Δ Backward * ΔManager’s time -0.547 -0.239 -1.525* -0.837 -0.623 -1.875* 0.240 
 (0.489) (0.682) (0.789) (1.029) (0.880) (1.016) (0.635) 
Δ Forward * ΔManager’s time 0.415 0.592 0.627 -0.896 1.480 1.945 0.144 
 (0.444) (0.512) (0.736) (0.978) (1.201) (1.192) (0.490) 
Δ Horizontal *ΔManager’s time 0.132 0.632** -0.270 0.143 0.003 0.814** -0.149 
 (0.299) (0.307) (0.395) (0.426) (0.599) (0.388) (0.356) 
Δ Manager’s time 0.014 0.057 -0.035 0.245** -0.139 0.011 0.031 
 (0.065) (0.096) (0.089) (0.123) (0.096) (0.131) (0.075) 
Observations 4981 1714 3267 1975 2293 1264 3717 
R-squared 0.60 0.62 0.60 0.65 0.57 0.57 0.62 
        
Panel B: Firm Level Linkages 
Sales to MNEs     0.036** 0.036* 0.034 0.037 0.027 0.038 0.036* 
 (0.016) (0.020) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.025) (0.020) 
Exports 0.061*** 0.035 0.041 0.059*** 0.069** 0.083** 0.048** 
 (0.018) (0.024) (0.029) (0.022) (0.030) (0.033) (0.022) 
Imports -0.009 0.018 -0.017 0.000 -0.016 0.003 -0.009 
 (0.010) (0.017) (0.012) (0.016) (0.014) (0.020) (0.011) 
SMNEs * ΔManager’s time -0.322 -0.426* -0.192 0.007 -0.771* -0.664 -0.116 
 (0.249) (0.251) (0.509) (0.453) (0.453) (0.448) (0.293) 
Exports * ΔManager’s time 0.117 0.042 -0.436 -0.100 -0.239 0.281 -0.062 
 (0.255) (0.301) (0.476) (0.332) (0.495) (0.440) (0.297) 
Imports *ΔManager’s time -0.005 0.124 -0.012 0.361 -0.259 0.300 -0.032 
 (0.152) (0.254) (0.195) (0.259) (0.203) (0.323) (0.171) 
Δ Manager’s time 0.021 0.068 -0.019 0.053 -0.013 -0.009 0.056 
 (0.079) (0.112) (0.113) (0.159) (0.115) (0.149) (0.094) 
Observations 4981 1714 3267 1975 2293 1264 3717 
R-squared 0.60 0.61 0.60 0.65 0.57 0.57 0.62 
 
Note: The table reports the estimated spillover effects on revenue efficiency using the 
specification in equation (8) in the paper.  Bureaucratic pressure is measured as the share of 
management’s time spent on dealing with officials. To reduce noise, we use the average value of 
manager’s time spent with officials in a given industry and country.  Robust clustered standard 
errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 5. Spillover Effects on Revenue Efficiency Using the Cobb-Douglas Function by 
Region. 
 
 CIS BALT CEE SEE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Δ Backward 0.139 0.127 0.005 0.062 
 (0.094) (0.098) (0.075) (0.058) 
Δ Forward 0.035 0.193 0.053 0.016 
 (0.075) (0.122) (0.074) (0.062) 
Δ Horizontal -0.019 0.003 -0.015 0.083** 
 (0.047) (0.037) (0.024) (0.035) 
Share of sales to MNEs 0.058** 0.139 0.080*** 0.026 
 (0.026) (0.136) (0.019) (0.022) 
Export share 0.083** 0.020 0.083*** 0.014 
 (0.039) (0.051) (0.023) (0.022) 
Import share 0.002 0.041* -0.008 -0.030** 
 (0.016) (0.024) (0.013) (0.014) 
Compete in national markets  0.017 0.048** 0.014 0.029*** 
 (0.012) (0.020) (0.010) (0.010) 
Elasticity of demand     
Low -0.032** -0.045** -0.026** -0.021* 
 (0.013) (0.022) (0.013) (0.012) 
Medium -0.042** -0.052 -0.046*** -0.015 
 (0.017) (0.034) (0.013) (0.014) 
High  -0.031** -0.054** -0.045*** -0.044*** 
 (0.014) (0.024) (0.012) (0.014) 
Observations 1463 430 1711 1377 
R-squared 0.61 0.64 0.54 0.63 
 
Note: Regions are defined as follows: CIS (Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine),  
Baltic (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), CEE (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia), and SEE 
(Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Yugoslavia, Slovenia). Firms of all types are included in 





Table 6: Effect of Whole/Partial Foreign Ownership and Source of FDI on Spillovers 
 
 ALL LARGE SMALL MNFG SERV OLD NEW 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Panel A 
Δ Backward (whole) 0.048 0.084 0.009 0.081 0.036 0.064 0.057 
 (0.048) (0.073) (0.067) (0.070) (0.080) (0.090) (0.059) 
Δ Backward (partial) 0.134** 0.215** 0.097 0.124 0.160 0.064 0.178** 
 (0.067) (0.105) (0.088) (0.113) (0.100) (0.122) (0.082) 
Δ Forward (whole) 0.025 0.075 0.004 -0.030 0.084 0.073 0.016 
 (0.040) (0.062) (0.054) (0.058) (0.081) (0.103) (0.043) 
Δ Forward (partial) 0.045 -0.080 0.090 0.190 0.108 0.095 0.006 
 (0.064) (0.098) (0.086) (0.129) (0.122) (0.128) (0.075) 
Δ Horizontal (whole) 0.006 0.041 -0.023 0.015 0.013 0.098* -0.031 
 (0.028) (0.043) (0.038) (0.043) (0.053) (0.053) (0.033) 
Δ  Horizontal (partial) 0.021 0.025 0.012 0.000 0.061* 0.047 0.013 
 (0.019) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.036) (0.038) (0.022) 
Observations 4980 1713 3267 1975 2293 1264 3716 
R-squared 0.60 0.62 0.60 0.65 0.57 0.57 0.62 
        
Panel B 
Δ Backward (OECD) 0.047 0.108 0.041 0.061 0.124* -0.025 0.107* 
 (0.047) (0.070) (0.067) (0.075) (0.075) (0.079) (0.060) 
Δ Backward (Non-OECD) 0.120** 0.216** 0.014 0.109 -0.014 0.269** 0.085 
 (0.050) (0.085) (0.066) (0.070) (0.115) (0.106) (0.058) 
Δ Forward (OECD) 0.024 -0.053 0.060 0.079 0.037 0.033 0.005 
 (0.047) (0.074) (0.061) (0.076) (0.087) (0.090) (0.055) 
Δ Forward  (Non-OECD) 0.058 0.113* 0.017 -0.028 0.209** 0.300** 0.021 
 (0.048) (0.068) (0.065) (0.072) (0.101) (0.133) (0.050) 
Δ Horizontal (OECD) 0.015 0.024 0.008 0.013 0.047 0.035 0.008 
 (0.016) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.036) (0.031) (0.019) 
Δ Horizontal  (Non-OECD) 0.033 0.053 0.015 -0.018 0.046 0.150*** -0.004 
 (0.027) (0.039) (0.037) (0.038) (0.060) (0.055) (0.033) 
Observations 4979 1712 3267 1975 2293 1264 3715 
R-squared 0.61 0.62 0.60 0.65 0.57 0.57 0.62 
Note: The table reports the estimated effects on revenue efficiency using a Cobb-Douglas 
production function, where the dependent variables is growth rate of sales revenues; the 
independent variables include three inputs (utilization adjusted capital, number of employees, 
materials), country and industry fixed effects, and the reported variables.  The set of other 
controls is identical to the set used in Table 1.   Panel A: The variables measuring changes in 
forward, backward and horizontal linkages are recalculated to differentiate the share of output in 
industry j produced by wholly-owned v. partially-owned foreign firms. Panel B: The variables 
measuring changes in forward, backward and horizontal linkages have been recalculated to 
differentiate the share of output in industry j produced by foreign firms with an OECD origin v. 
foreign firms with a non-OECD origin. Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses; * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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 Table 7.  Effect of Distance from the Frontier on the Strength of Spillovers 
 ALL LARGE SMALL MNFG SERV OLD NEW 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Panel A 
Δ Backward 0.205* 0.260 0.171 0.212 0.153 0.477** 0.086 
 (0.124) (0.183) (0.174) (0.158) (0.261) (0.236) (0.145) 
Δ Forward 0.004 0.089 -0.109 0.005 0.004 0.025 -0.032 
 (0.114) (0.166) (0.157) (0.163) (0.257) (0.225) (0.130) 
Δ Horizontal 0.056 0.017 0.068 0.123* 0.141 0.130 0.015 
 (0.050) (0.064) (0.077) (0.067) (0.108) (0.097) (0.059) 
Δ Backward * Distance -0.043 -0.040 -0.043 -0.041 -0.024 -0.142* 0.006 
 (0.041) (0.059) (0.059) (0.056) (0.081) (0.074) (0.050) 
Δ Forward *Distance 0.009 -0.027 0.049 0.008 0.023 0.016 0.017 
 (0.038) (0.056) (0.052) (0.057) (0.082) (0.072) (0.045) 
Δ Horizontal * Distance -0.017 -0.001 -0.023 -0.046* -0.036 -0.033 -0.006 
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.027) (0.024) (0.039) (0.034) (0.021) 
Distance -0.011*** -0.008 -0.010* -0.011* -0.019*** -0.008 -0.010** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) 
Observations 4867 1655 3212 1939 2230 1235 3632 
R-squared 0.61 0.62 0.60 0.65 0.58 0.58 0.62 
        
Panel B: Firm Level Linkages 
Sales to MNEs     0.050 0.014 0.091 0.117** -0.037 0.088 0.021 
 (0.036) (0.046) (0.063) (0.058) (0.074) (0.083) (0.041) 
Exports 0.055 0.024 0.118* 0.059 0.111 0.019 0.077* 
 (0.036) (0.047) (0.063) (0.042) (0.123) (0.071) (0.044) 
Imports -0.002 -0.017 0.016 -0.015 -0.007 -0.016 0.003 
 (0.024) (0.040) (0.030) (0.035) (0.037) (0.057) (0.026) 
Δ SMNEs * Distance -0.000 0.017 -0.018 -0.033 0.032 -0.011 0.008 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.026) (0.028) (0.024) (0.030) (0.017) 
Δ Exports * Distance -0.002 0.003 -0.028 -0.003 -0.013 0.021 -0.015 
 (0.014) (0.019) (0.023) (0.019) (0.041) (0.025) (0.018) 
Δ Imports * Distance -0.004 0.010 -0.013 0.001 -0.003 0.001 -0.005 
 (0.009) (0.015) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013) (0.020) (0.010) 
Distance -0.008* -0.011 -0.003 -0.004 -0.019** -0.008 -0.009 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.005) 
Observations 4867 1655 3212 1939 2230 1235 3632 
R-squared 0.61 0.62 0.60 0.65 0.58 0.57 0.62 
 
Note: The table reports the estimated spillover effects on revenue efficiency using the 
specification in equation (8) in the paper. Distance is measured according to the Mahalanobis 
metric using all foreign firms. See text for further details on the construction of this metric. 
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 





Table 8.  Effect of the Education on the Strength of Spillovers 
 ALL LARGE SMALL MNFG SERV OLD NEW 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Panel A: Industry Level Linkages 
Δ Backward 0.067 0.103 0.035 0.103 0.103 0.201** 0.072 
 (0.046) (0.075) (0.062) (0.064) (0.081) (0.090) (0.056) 
Δ Forward 0.047 0.023 0.062 0.048 0.078 -0.058 0.051 
 (0.043) (0.064) (0.058) (0.058) (0.086) (0.096) (0.049) 
Δ Horizontal 0.028 0.003 0.027 0.011 0.062 0.053 0.015 
 (0.021) (0.031) (0.028) (0.028) (0.046) (0.040) (0.025) 
Δ Backward * Edu 0.044 0.224 0.008 -0.107 -0.110 -0.664* 0.107 
 (0.120) (0.237) (0.139) (0.160) (0.200) (0.367) (0.131) 
Δ Forward * Edu -0.049 -0.005 -0.093 -0.072 0.082 0.695** -0.127 
 (0.105) (0.145) (0.131) (0.135) (0.194) (0.311) (0.115) 
Δ Horizontal * Edu -0.042 0.098 -0.075 -0.018 -0.042 0.015 -0.041 
 (0.049) (0.099) (0.058) (0.082) (0.074) (0.120) (0.053) 
Edu 0.028** -0.003 0.045*** 0.032 0.040** 0.000 0.035*** 
 (0.012) (0.025) (0.013) (0.019) (0.016) (0.032) (0.013) 
Observations 4929 1678 3251 1957 2265 1244 3685 
R-squared 0.60 0.62 0.60 0.65 0.57 0.57 0.62 
        
Panel B: Firm Level Linkages 
Sales to MNEs     0.041** 0.025 0.045 0.046* 0.035 0.035 0.036 
 (0.018) (0.023) (0.028) (0.028) (0.034) (0.031) (0.022) 
Exports 0.077*** 0.059** 0.056* 0.064*** 0.110** 0.080** 0.070*** 
 (0.019) (0.026) (0.030) (0.021) (0.045) (0.036) (0.022) 
Imports -0.020* 0.014 -0.032** -0.012 -0.020 -0.026 -0.018 
     (0.011) (0.020) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.025) (0.012) 
SMNEs * Edu 0.035 0.137** -0.029 -0.044 0.044 0.129 0.022 
 (0.051) (0.066) (0.068) (0.144) (0.060) (0.114) (0.057) 
Exports * Edu -0.089* -0.140 -0.022 -0.015 -0.100 -0.051 -0.084 
 (0.054) (0.091) (0.067) (0.065) (0.077) (0.134) (0.060) 
Imports * Edu 0.024 -0.016 0.040 -0.021 0.019 0.055 0.020 
 (0.027) (0.064) (0.031) (0.053) (0.036) (0.072) (0.030) 
Edu 0.026* -0.001 0.039** 0.042 0.041** -0.008 0.034** 
 (0.014) (0.033) (0.016) (0.026) (0.019) (0.040) (0.015) 
Observations 4929 1678 3251 1957 2265 1244 3685 
R-squared 0.60 0.62 0.60 0.65 0.57 0.57 0.62 
 
Note: The table reports the estimated spillover effects on revenue efficiency using the 
specification in equation (8) in the paper.  Edu is the share of worker with higher education 
(university education).  Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** 




In this appendix we describe the sampling frame of the BEEPs. As mentioned in 
the main text, the sampling frames of the 2002 and 2005 BEEPS are very similar.  Both 
were designed to have the following general targeted distributional criteria: 
 
• Coverage of countries: Both the 2002 and 2005 surveys were to be administered to 28 
transition economies: 16 from CEEE (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, FR Yugoslavia, FYROM, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Turkey) and 12 from the 
CIS (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, 
Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan). In neither year could the 
survey be administered in Turkmenistan. 
 
• Sector: In each country, the sectoral composition of the sample in terms of 
manufacturing23 versus services24 was to be determined by their relative contribution 
to GDP. Firms that operate in sectors subject to government price regulation and 
prudential supervision, such as banking, electric power, rail transport, and water and 
waste water, were to be excluded from the sample 
 
• Size: At least 10% of the sample was to be in the small and 10% in the large size 
categories.25 Firms with only one employee or more than 10,000 employees were to 
be excluded.  
 
• Ownership: At least 10% of the firms were to have foreign control and 10% state 
control, based on more than 50% shareholding. 
 
• Exporters: At least 10% of the firms were to be exporters, meaning that 20% or more 
of total sales is exported.  
 
• Location: At least 10% of firms were to be in the category “small city/countryside” 
(Population under 50,000 inhabitants). 
 
In 2005, the survey instrument was administered to an additional 1,700 
manufacturing enterprises in seven countries: Kazakhstan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Poland, 
Hungary, Romania and Moldova.  This sample was to be distributed between at least two 
major industrial regions within each country and distributed evenly among manufacturing 
enterprises operating within three sectors: garments, food processing and metal and 
                                                 
23 Manufacturing includes mining and quarrying, construction, manufacturing and agro-processing 
24 Services includes: Transportation, storage and communications; Wholesale, retail, repairs; Real estate, 
business services; Hotels and restaurants; Other community, social and personal activities; and Commerce. 
25 Small=2-49 employees, Medium=50-249, Large=250-9,999. 
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machinery. The aim was to keep the sectoral composition as similar as possible across 
countries.26  
The original 2005 data base is comprised of a total of 7,942 firms, with 200-600 
firms per country. The share of firms in services ranged from 50% to 65% across the 27 
countries. Between two-thirds and three-quarters of the firms have less than 50 
employees.  Approximately 10% of the firms are foreign owned and another 10% are 
state owned.  The share of firms that export more than 20% of their output varies 





                                                 
26 Specifically, the sectors were to be constant at the 3-digit ISIC code. However, if it was not possible to 
obtain enough observations to complete the sampling overlay while limiting it to the 3-digit ISIC code, then 




















Table A1: Sources and Years of Input-Output Tables 
 
Year Country Source 
2000 Albania Mark Horrige27 
2000 Bulgaria National statistical office 
1999 Croatia National statistical office 
1999 Czech Republic CR National Statistical Yearbook 
1997 Estonia Eurostat 
2004 Georgia  National statistical office 
1998 Hungary Eurostat 
2002 Kazakhstan P. Hare and A. Naumov (2005, p 28) 
1998 Latvia National statistical office 
2001 Lithuania National statistical office 
2000 Poland Eurostat 
2002 Romania National statistical office 
2003 Russia National statistical office 
2005 Serbia National statistical office 
2000 Slovakia National statistical office 
2001 Slovenia Eurostat 
2003 Ukraine National statistical office 
 
Note: All input-output tables were at the NACE 2-digit level except for Kazakhstan and 
Russia, which were at the 1-digit level and were converted to 2-digit using weights 
constructed from data on output by industries. 
 
 
                                                 
27 Mark Horrige, “Albania Input-Output Table” GTAP/USAID. Table downloaded from 
http://www.monash.edu.au/policy/archivep.htm.  
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Table A2. Spillover Effects on Revenue Efficiency Using Cobb-Douglas Production 




LARGE SMALL MNFG SERVICES OLD NEW 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Δ Backward 0.102 0.130 0.065 0.035 0.161 0.033 0.161* 
(0.079) (0.119) (0.119) (0.129) (0.122) (0.170) (0.094) 
Δ Forward -0.014 -0.133 0.078 -0.211* 0.115 -0.065 0.016 
 (0.076) (0.105) (0.107) (0.126) (0.148) (0.193) (0.091) 
Δ Horizontal -0.002 0.064 -0.063 0.032 0.102 0.020 -0.003 
 (0.046) (0.052) (0.068) (0.079) (0.073) (0.072) (0.060) 
Share of sales to MNEs 0.050 0.003 0.080* -0.008 0.060 0.042 0.053 
 (0.032) (0.058) (0.043) (0.058) (0.047) (0.069) (0.037) 
Export share 0.030 0.034 -0.024 -0.049 0.065 -0.006 0.064 
 (0.035) (0.054) (0.066) (0.055) (0.055) (0.056) (0.056) 
Import share 0.015 0.034 0.014 0.007 0.029 -0.006 0.018 
 (0.019) (0.037) (0.025) (0.039) (0.028) (0.040) (0.023) 
Compete in national markets  0.022 -0.004 0.036* 0.049 0.026 0.026 0.012 
 (0.016) (0.029) (0.021) (0.037) (0.022) (0.032) (0.018) 
Elasticity of demand        
Low -0.016 -0.015 -0.027 0.061 -0.034 -0.006 -0.020 
 (0.019) (0.029) (0.026) (0.046) (0.024) (0.037) (0.024) 
Medium -0.032 -0.031 -0.033 0.025 -0.055* 0.041 -0.044 
 (0.023) (0.040) (0.029) (0.060) (0.030) (0.048) (0.028) 
High  -0.028 -0.045 -0.020 0.049 -0.055* 0.006 -0.024 
 (0.021) (0.039) (0.026) (0.053) (0.028) (0.042) (0.025) 
Observations 773 296 477 180 458 222 551 
R-squared 0.64 0.68 0.63 0.70 0.61 0.69 0.65 
 
 
Note: The sample includes only firms present in both 2002 and 2005 surveys. The table reports 
the estimated effects on revenue efficiency using a Cobb-Douglas function, where the dependent 
variables is growth rate of sales revenues; the independent variables include the growth rate of 
three inputs (utilization adjusted capital, number of employees and materials), country and 
industry fixed effects, and the reported variables. See text for definition of variables. Large firms 
are defined as firms with more than 30 employees. MNFG = manufacturing firms according to 
NACE classification. OLD firms are defined as firms established before 1991.  NEW firms are 
established in 1991 or after 1991.  Benchmark group for the elasticity of demand is “inelastic”.  
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 




Table A3. Descriptive Statistics 
 ALL  LARGE SMALL MNFG SERVICES OLD NEW Variable 
 mean sd  mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd 
Δ Backward  -0.0161 0.1191  -0.0097 0.1289 -0.0195 0.1134 -0.0216 0.1324 -0.0125 0.1097 -0.0100 0.1336 -0.0182 0.1137 
Δ Forward  -0.0073 0.1316  -0.0003 0.1400 -0.0109 0.1269 0.0009 0.1443 -0.0143 0.1213 -0.0003 0.1331 -0.0096 0.1311 
Δ Horizontal  -0.0367 0.1964  -0.0375 0.2006 -0.0363 0.1941 -0.0522 0.2150 -0.0364 0.1705 -0.0430 0.2004 -0.0346 0.1950 
Share of sales to MNEs  0.0566 0.1766  0.0850 0.2131 0.0416 0.1520 0.0723 0.2002 0.0438 0.1557 0.0630 0.1839 0.0544 0.1740 
Export share  0.0684 0.1878  0.1283 0.2499 0.0369 0.1348 0.1081 0.2327 0.0471 0.1543 0.1053 0.2252 0.0558 0.1715 
Import share  0.2588 0.3592  0.2656 0.3346 0.2553 0.3715 0.2797 0.3568 0.2507 0.3692 0.2539 0.3421 0.2605 0.3649 
Compete in national markets  0.5103 0.4999  0.6307 0.4828 0.4472 0.4973 0.6086 0.4882 0.4313 0.4954 0.6210 0.4853 0.4727 0.4993 
Elasticity of demand                 
Inelastic  0.2218 0.4155  0.2421 0.4284 0.2112 0.4082 0.1949 0.3962 0.2481 0.4319 0.2350 0.4240 0.2174 0.4125 
Low  0.3124 0.4635  0.3314 0.4708 0.3024 0.4594 0.3225 0.4676 0.3031 0.4597 0.2967 0.4570 0.3177 0.4657 
Medium  0.1775 0.3821  0.1692 0.3750 0.1818 0.3858 0.1858 0.3891 0.1736 0.3788 0.1733 0.3786 0.1789 0.3833 
High  0.2883 0.4530  0.2573 0.4373 0.3046 0.4603 0.2967 0.4569 0.2752 0.4467 0.2951 0.4563 0.2860 0.4519 
lnKU  0.0981 0.2464  0.1253 0.2509 0.0838 0.2428 0.1025 0.2595 0.0869 0.2324 0.0640 0.2189 0.1097 0.2540 
lnM  0.0795 0.2243  0.1087 0.2198 0.0642 0.2252 0.0833 0.2372 0.0658 0.2114 0.0515 0.2052 0.0891 0.2297 
lnL  0.0730 0.4649  0.1078 0.4581 0.0547 0.4675 0.0552 0.4602 0.0783 0.4533 -0.0560 0.3775 0.1169 0.4834 
Edu  0.2488 0.2827  0.2297 0.2374 0.2586 0.3031 0.1884 0.2211 0.3116 0.3239 0.2123 0.2407 0.2611 0.2946 
Δ Bribe  -0.0120 0.0224  -0.0123 0.0237 -0.0118 0.0217 -0.0140 0.0208 -0.0105 0.0242 -0.0106 0.0225 -0.0125 0.0223 
Δ Manager’s time  -0.0357 0.0480  -0.0363 0.0533 -0.0354 0.0450 -0.0386 0.0407 -0.0335 0.0501 -0.0361 0.0500 -0.0356 0.0473 
Distance  2.5699 0.8683  2.3970 0.9516 2.6590 0.8079 2.2877 0.8063 2.7705 0.8336 2.5575 0.8904 2.5742 0.8608 
Whole                  
Δ Backward  -0.0077 0.0968  -0.0008 0.1017 -0.0113 0.0940 -0.0093 0.0975 -0.0069 0.0978 -0.0010 0.1044 -0.0100 0.0940 
Δ Forward  -0.0010 0.1040  0.0063 0.1096 -0.0048 0.1008 0.0110 0.1153 -0.0109 0.0983 0.0066 0.1043 -0.0036 0.1039 
Δ Horizontal  -0.0135 0.1641  -0.0129 0.1621 -0.0139 0.1652 -0.0257 0.1690 -0.0155 0.1482 -0.0190 0.1704 -0.0117 0.1619 
Partial                 
Δ Backward  -0.0084 0.0568  -0.0088 0.0571 -0.0082 0.0567 -0.0123 0.0599 -0.0056 0.0567 -0.0090 0.0565 -0.0082 0.0569 
Δ Forward  -0.0063 0.0542  -0.0067 0.0585 -0.0061 0.0518 -0.0102 0.0490 -0.0033 0.0512 -0.0070 0.0535 -0.0061 0.0544 
Δ Horizontal  -0.0231 0.1074  -0.0245 0.1153 -0.0224 0.1030 -0.0265 0.1295 -0.0209 0.0912 -0.0240 0.1084 -0.0228 0.1071 
OECD                 
 53
Δ Backward  -0.0272 0.0923  -0.0232 0.1007 -0.0293 0.0876 -0.0379 0.1049 -0.0201 0.0847 -0.0291 0.1040 -0.0266 0.0880 
Δ Forward  -0.0157 0.0894  -0.0109 0.0910 -0.0183 0.0884 -0.0026 0.0939 -0.0265 0.0856 -0.0107 0.0892 -0.0175 0.0894 
Δ Horizontal  -0.0286 0.1771  -0.0309 0.1812 -0.0274 0.1749 -0.0525 0.2222 -0.0130 0.1287 -0.0420 0.1939 -0.0241 0.1708 
Non-OECD                 
Δ Backward  0.0111 0.0785  0.0136 0.0872 0.0098 0.0736 0.0163 0.0828 0.0076 0.0763 0.0191 0.0825 0.0084 0.0770 
Δ Forward  0.0085 0.0915  0.0106 0.0969 0.0074 0.0885 0.0035 0.0984 0.0122 0.0891 0.0104 0.0864 0.0079 0.0932 
Δ Horizontal  -0.0081 0.1251  -0.0068 0.1273 -0.0088 0.1240 0.0002 0.1329 -0.0234 0.1110 -0.0010 0.1261 -0.0105 0.1247 
N  4,981   1,714  3,267  1,975  2,293  1,264  3,717  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
